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INTRODUCTION
The study stems from an interest in family controlled business and the role of controls therein. The paper attempts to elucidate the nature and dynamics of management controls in Family-Owned Businesses (FOBs) especially in the context of a less developed country (LDC). It reports on the results of a case study on management controls in an Indonesian private University owned by two Javanese families. The study is motivated by the lack of research on management control issues in FOBs, particularly in LDCs (Ansari and Bell, 1991; Chan, et al., 2001 ). The paper contributes to the emerging management accounting literature in LDCs Hopper, 2001, 2003) .
The importance of FOBs in the economies of both the developed and the developing world has been extensively discussed in the literature (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Shanker, and Astrachan, 1996; Klein, 2000; Poza, 1995; Corbetta, 1995) . In this study, family owned business is defined as a business owned and run by members of one or two families (Stern, 1986, p.xxi) 1 . According to Narva and Dreux (1996) family owned businesses can be for-profit or not-for-profit, foundations or investment groups (hence family run educational institutions fall under the ambit of FOBs).
The proportion of businesses broadly classified as FOBs varies from country to country. In Indonesia, it has been reported that FOBs contribute as much as 82% of the country's GNP (Faustine, 2001) . In a recent study, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) also However, recent years have seen the emergence of indigenous Indonesian Javanese as FOB entrepreneurs. As argued by Rademakers (1998) , the extant literature on FOBs in South East Asia (including Indonesia) is dominated by the 'Chinese family business' (CFB) management system which has been found to be distinct from other similar business systems such as the Korean chaebol and the Japanese keiretsu and sogo sosha (see also Whitley 1992) . Little empirical evidence is therefore available on managerial issues in indigenous Indonesian FOBs. Thus, the paper examines the following research issues:
1. Dynamics of management control processes in a family owned business 2. The influence of societal culture on management control processes Controls can be formal or informal. Formal controls consist of high levels of output and process controls such as budgeting, performance measurement, incentive systems and other administrative roles. Informal controls consist of high levels of professional and cultural controls such as laws, norms, ethics, etiquette, and customs, which define behavior. While both types of controls may be present in organizations (Jaworski, 1988 ) the use of informal controls have been found to be more prevalent in developing countries (see for instance, Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; and Dean, 2001) . Control processes in our paper refer to formal functional roles within the organization including budgeting, performance measurement, incentive systems and other administrative roles and also informal processes designed to achieve organizational objectives.
We are particularly interested in how these formal roles are achieved via informal processes and the way in which the larger cultural context mediates these roles (Ansari and Bell, 1991) . Very few accounting studies, especially in the context of LDCs, have studied management controls in a family owned business. In a recent study, Chan et al., (2001) , examined how management controls operated in two eminent family Chinese households during the 18 th century. The authors presented evidence to show that accounting was implicated in the decision making of the families. One of the most detailed studies conducted on management controls in FOBs is that of Ansari and Bell (1991) . Using a longitudinal case study, the authors investigated the influence of societal culture on the accounting and control practices of a Pakistani FOB. The findings of this study suggest that in addition to the rational economic view, the design of accounting and control systems in the organization could be explained from a cultural perspective.
This paper draws heavily on cultural perspectives of control, given the importance of various cultural and societal values on controls in LDCs' enterprises (Gray, 1988; Rademakers, 1998; Dean, 2001; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2004; Pourjalali and Meek, 1995; Lau and Tan, 1998; Brewer, 1998; Harrison et al., 1994) . It was felt that management control processes were best studied by applying cultural perspectives (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2004; Pourjalali and Meek, 1995) as controls in LDCs, which operate in a complex cultural environment where owner-officials realise their ends using a series of informal processes on the shop floor and elsewhere (Uddin and Hopper, 2001) . The study seeks to understand the events in the case study by using the cultural perspective adopted by Ansari and Bell, (1991) . Our approach to the application of cultural values in explaining control practices is not static. It is a study of symbolic processes through which people produce and reproduce social order. Ansari and Bell (1991) commented that "a critical feature of the approach is the emphasis on the native's viewpoint as it unfolds in the linguistic categories that are used to organise experience and give meaning to it". They added that "culture is neither a monolith, as sometimes portrayed in studies that are cross-cultural, nor is it invariant over time. It is the dynamic processes of social change that are at the heart of cultural studies" (p.8).
Ansari and Bell's work (1991), based on interpretive anthropology (Geertz, 1978 (Geertz, , 1983 , used in this study, has two key features. First, it relies on linguistic categories and idiom. In this paper, a number of key idioms or phrases are used which drive our explanations. Second, it uses kinship and clan structures to explain events. For example we provide evidence to illustrate how family members are looked after through employment in own business. Geertz (1978) recommended the application of the anthropological tradition in data collection to understand the influence of linguistic and idioms, and kinship and clan structure on organisational and social practices [see Ansari and Bell's paper] . One of the authors worked for the business that is the subject of the present case study for several years. Our data not only consist of interviews and conversations but also personal observations (see research method section for details).
The application of an anthropological understanding of culture is not a new concept in management accounting literature, but the contribution of this paper is to apply it in the context of a less developed family owned business. This paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature on management control and family ownership, especially for LDCs. Theoretically, the paper demonstrates the usefulness of culture in explaining management control processes in LDCs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the research methods. This is followed by sections on political and socio-cultural contexts of Indonesia; and brief overview of Higher Education in Indonesia and the background of the University. The next section then presents the empirical findings. The last section provides discussions and conclusions.
METHODS
There is an increasing emphasis by management accounting researchers on the adoption of an organizational perspective and interaction with a variety of organizational participants in order to illuminate the dynamics of management accounting practices (Burchell et al., 1980; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Hopwood 1978) . The approach adopted here follows this perspective. Although we did not start
with an a priori model to guide data collection, the cultural perspective adopted here seemed more appropriate to understand the control practices at this university.
The study is based on a field study to explore management controls in their organizational context (Flamholtz 1983 (Geertz, 1972) . Basic Indonesian principles in businesses and institutions have been inspired by the various cultural values such as the concepts of mutual assistance (gotong royong) and communal meetings and gatherings (musyawarah) to arrive at a consensus (mufakat). This system derives from the traditions of agriculturally-based rural life, and is still very much in use in community life throughout the country (Geertz, 1972) .
The Indonesian society is ethnically divided with Javanese as the largest and most influential ethnic group. Java is therefore central in the development of modern Indonesia. For centuries Java Island has been the cultural, political, and economic center of Indonesia. For examples, most of Indonesia's leading higher education institutions are located on Java Island and the island also has more development than any other island in Indonesia. Although Java constitutes only one seventh of the country's total area or the fifth largest island of Indonesia, it contains two thirds of the country's population that make it as the most densely populated island in Indonesia.
Javanese influence is also linked with the political power in Indonesia family owned businesses such as our case study.
INDONESIAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE UNIVERSITY
This section provides a brief overview of the Indonesian higher Education Sector and then presents some background information about the University in our case study.
Overview of the Indonesian Higher Education Sector
The earliest forms of Indonesian higher learning were mainly Islamic but had international links with universities in Egypt. The state's support in higher education during this period was minimal. The earliest private higher Islamic institutions founded in as far back as the 1910s and 1920s Welch 2006 ). The first post-independence higher education institution (HEI) in Indonesia was Gadjah Madah University, a state university founded in Jogjakarta in 1949 through the conversion of an earlier private HEI (Welch, 2006) . Two other private universities, namely the Indonesian Islamic University and the National University were established in the immediate post war years (Welch, 2006; Buchori & Malik, 2004) . There was a huge growth in private HEI in the 1960s as a result of the lack of state resources to establish and support state run HEI to match the continued demand of higher education in the country (Pardoen, 1998) .
The majority of these private HEIs were however unofficial and unaccredited Welch, 2006 . There are a significant number of private HEIs are not accredited. And geographic dispersal is adding to these difficulties-although in the early 1990s, some 25% of all private
HEIs were still located either in Jakarta (16.4%) or East Java (9.6%), (Pardoen, 1998, p. 28) . The proliferation in recent years of private HEIs, which now exist well outside the major cities in which higher education was traditionally concentrated, itself presents certain dilemmas. Generally, the problems of monitoring private HEIs lead to several particulars concerning government policies, quality control and financial matters. '' (Hadijardaja, 1996, p. 42) .
Nevertheless, our case university is accredited by BAN.
Private HEIs do not receive public monies from government but may be eligible for certain forms of subsidy, or incentives, according to pertinent regulations. The incentives usually in the form of buildings, but can also be in the form of staff seconded from public sector HEIs. All in all, some 10% of private HEI academics are paid by government (Buchori & Malik, 2004, p. 251) . Student fees are the major (often only) incomes, and donations are also sought. Our case study shows similar evidence. The main revenue is mainly student fees.
Brief Background of the Studied Institution
Our case study is located in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. It was established in the late 1960s by two close friends, who are both responsible for its operations and management. The University consists of two institutions -a foundation, and the University itself. According to Indonesian government regulations, an educational institution has to be organized by a foundation since educational institutions are non profit-oriented institutions. One of the two friends has the responsibility as the Head of the Foundation and the other as the CEO of the University. The CEO is the highest decision-maker in the University and is responsible for establishing the University's policies and regulations. The Head of the Foundation, on the other hand, is responsible for establishing the University's vision, mission, goals, strategy, and planning for the University's financing, facilities and infrastructure. The Foundation also has a function of monitoring and evaluating the University's programs and activities in addition to the right to authorize, control and supervise the annual costs and revenues of the University.
Formally, the foundation acts as a supervisory board for the university. The CEO and the Head consist of the top management of the University.
With an active student body of around 6,000, the University is one of the largest private institutions in Indonesia. The University currently employs about 187
administrative staff and about 132 teaching or academic staff. The workforce is divided into: teaching staff (lecturers), research staff, administration staff (supporting the teaching and learning process and administrative duties), and cleaning and security services. The organizational structure of the university is provided in figure one below.
[Insert Figure One Here]
In the next section we examine the nature of management controls in the university.
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS IN THE UNIVERSITY
The Head of the foundation is the formal chief officer of both the foundation and the University as a whole but the CEO acts as the top executive manager of the University, looking after day-to-day activities. The University has a number of functional areas including, finance, academic affairs, internal audit and control, purchasing and human resources. All functional departmental officials/managers report directly to the CEO, except the Academic affairs manager and treasury.
Treasury reports to the Head of the foundation. Academic affairs reports to the deputy CEO. The following subsections briefly explain some of the important functional controls of the university.
Financial Controls
There are two sets of financial control department -Treasury and Finance. The treasury comes under the control of the Head of foundation while finance department is under the control of the CEO. The treasury department is responsible for the collection of incomes from various sources including student tuition fees and consultancy fees. All funds collected are recorded in a book by the treasurer and paid into the institution's bank account to be used for the financing of University activities.
The treasury department also issues the payment orders for the finance department to pay suppliers, employees etc. In a way, the treasury department, controlled by the foundation, is an overseeing department for the finance department. This is due to the Indonesian Higher Education Act which requires the foundation to become the supervisory board for the university. Finance Department with a purchasing plan, which is subsequently submitted to the foundation for authorization once an appropriate supplier is found.
Routine payments do not require the approval from the CEO. However, the purchasing team is obliged to report non-routine requests to the CEO for review. A request can be rejected by the CEO if he disagrees with it. After a purchasing request has been approved by the CEO, it is brought to the institution's treasury for evaluation, and a cost estimate is sent to the Head of the Foundation for approval.
After being agreed by the Head, the cost estimate is sent to the treasury, which provides the required funds to the finance department. The finance department then pays the supplier directly. If an item is requested after the monthly budget has already been agreed, permission has to be sought from both the Head of the Foundation and the CEO. Once such authorization has been received, the foundation cashier pays the supplier directly on the advice of the purchasing team. The expenditure is then accounted for in the following month's budget. The interviewees described the current monthly budgeting system as a 'pay as you go' system.
The University does not make any long-term financial planning. Strategic planning, annual budgeting and long term planning, in accounting terms, are therefore nonexistent. Attempts were however made at the beginning of the 2002/2003 financial year to introduce annual budgeting into the University. The CEO appointed a committee to review the budgeting process and to make recommendations to management as to whether any change is necessary. After much consultation, the committee recommended the use of annual budgets instead of the current practice of reliance only on the monthly budgets. The recommendations also included the need to involve all departments in the budgeting process. In September of the same year, under the guidance of the Finance manager, all departmental heads produced budgets for their activity units for a one-year period. The heads of departments and the finance team then had a meeting where the departmental budgets were consolidated into a master budget. The CEO however abandoned the annual budgeting system after one year of operation. Some of the university officials interviewed commented that the CEO was not very enthusiastic about the annual budget. Thus, the institution reverted to the monthly budgeting system.
Other Functional Controls
Internal audit and control seem to be one of the important functional areas which the top management of the university focuses their attentions. This is not only because it is linked with the budgeting but also because of government regulations which oblige the foundation, as organizer of the University, to meet its financial requirements. To meet the requirements, the University has initially set up one department namely internal control department to monitor some important activities such as purchasing, stock controls and other finance related areas.
Under this department, only one person was responsible for the purchasing function, which involves searching for suppliers, making purchases and paying the suppliers.
However, after complain by some employees about the need for more transparency in purchasing, the CEO created a new department called internal audit and control which led to the separation of the purchasing function. A four-member purchasing team was subsequently appointed by the CEO to be responsible for the activities in the newly created department. One manager noted during the interview that: The team members are considered reliable by the CEO, so that he is confident that suppliers chosen by the team are appropriate. In addition, it has now become a policy that all goods deliveries by the general affairs department must be supported by evidence of delivery. The finance department compiles reports on budget implementation in departments/activity units, which are sent directly to the CEO with copies to the Head of the Foundation, and to the internal audit and control. The internal audit and control is also responsible for monitoring all activities relating to human resources, goods and money. A senior university official interviewed summarized the rationale for creating the internal audit and control department as: The University has been forced to establish the internal audit and control department to detect and combat corruptions in all major routine and non-routine functions.
Performance Measurement
Formally, the head of the human resource department reports to the CEO on appointment, promotion, etc. Interviews with the employees seem to be indicating that a punitive incentive system existed in the University, for example, salary cut for non The university has a committee of 3 members that advises the CEO on salary levels. In making its recommendations, the committee pays attention to several factors, including the decree of the Education and Culture minister, level of the minimum regional wage, the institution's financial condition, and general economic conditions such as the level of inflation. The CEO also seeks the opinions of the Head of the Foundation in salary decisions. However, the final decision about salaries is the prerogative of the CEO.
The interviews however suggest that there is lack of transparency in the ways in which salary levels and promotions are determined. For some, the CEO's centralized management approach has been very successful, as he has managed to adopt the same approach from the early years of the institution as a small university to its present form as one of the largest private Universities in the country. This success has increased the CEO's confidence in the use of centralized controls. This paper seeks to question why centralized controls appeared to work the way they do. The following subsections shed light on the informal controls which the top management appeared to exercise in all aspects of the institution.
Social and Informal Controls -The Role of CEO
Officially, the university in many ways resembles institutions in the West in terms of rules and routines including the budgeting and control processes. In reality, the university combines a low level of formalization (less reliance on written rules) with a very high level of informal procedures in its daily activities. Officially, the CEO is accountable to the treasury and the foundation. In reality, the CEO dominates the whole affairs of the university as will be shown later. Generally, management is based on the concept of the family, where employees are more reliant on constructive verbal feedback in performing their everyday duties. Informal and personal controls affected all aspects of the institution as will be detailed below.
Officially, the university is supervised by the foundation. In reality, the foundation and its Head rarely questions the CEO's decisions. This has been summed up by a manager as: "it is usually happens whatever the CEO seeks to achieve. The current form of formal performance appraisals for the university management is also facilitated by the apparent lack of a work design for reference/guidance. Some managers often claim they don't have any tangible targets to follow so that performance can be assessed against those targets or goals. The "supervising from outside" approach seems to be questioned by some managers. One senior manager, however, recognized the need for more formal performance evaluation of officials:
We have reached a stage where documented evaluation is greatly needed in order to be able to conduct corrections, so that mistakes and weaknesses which have occurred in the past will not recur in future. This view was however not shared by other interviewees as another manager interviewed commented that: "informal controls are also necessary in the institution because many employees have familial relations with one another". Nevertheless, this seems to be working smoothly given the CEO's centralized management style.
The CEO plays a considerable role in appointing university managers/heads of departments. One manager commented during the interview that "the CEO himself assesses candidates' ability to hold the particular position". When it is necessary to recruit new employees, families of existing employees are always given priority. The
Head of Foundation and the CEO also provide many opportunities for their families or friends to work in the institution. The reason behind this has been traced to the Indonesian culture, which is based on the principle that it is the obligation of people in positions of advantage to help their family members. Because of this, priority is always given to family members in any situation of employee recruitment. This approach, however, seem to have some difficulties in resolving problems arising between employees using any formal means. The family has to take precedence in any conflict resolution. Some interviewees noted that questioning the familial and centralized controls will not be in their best interests. For example, a manager argued and to resolve problems using the family principle. Thus, the nature of actual control at the university and the role of the CEO have never been questioned as they reflect the social context in which the institution is operating.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the case results we presented above, we argued that while some form of formal management controls exists in the organization, in practice they are subservient to social and cultural controls. Thus while some form of technical-rational explanations could be offered for the control practices, the majority of the controls in the organization could be explained based on culture and social relations. Formal accounting appears to exist for ritualistic purposes, as most decisions are made with little regard for formal accounting data. For example, formal budgeting systems were rarely followed in practice. Also, the creation of the internal audit control department was mainly to satisfy the Education Ministry's requirements.
A summary of the influence of the Javanese culture on management controls discussed above is provided in table one below.
[Insert Table One Here] One of the key issues we identified was that there is a high level of centralization of power, with authority being traced to a single individual -the CEO. This is not surprising as prior studies (Rademakers, 1998; Geertz, 1972) The importance of family ties and hierarchy within the Indonesian context especially Javanese has also been identified by other studies (Rademakers, 1998; Dean, 2001 From the interview results it was also found that while some form of conflict exists among certain officials, this is not shown on the surface due to the need to maintain apparent peace with each other especially with senior members of institution/society.
Thus, employees try to conceal any conflicts and negative feelings and therefore dysfunctional behavior is hardly demonstrated. This is similar to Whitfield's (2003) findings. He found employees in Indonesian organizations are reluctant to talk to a clear superior concerning problems or concerns in the performance of their own duties. In the organizations, any problem should be solved by the subordinate without informing the superior, which, as a result, spares him the unpleasant experience of receiving bad news.
In day-to-day activities, employees have been influenced by the word Rukun.
Rukun is an important Javanese word describing "a state in which all parties are at least overtly at social peace with one another." Reliance on informal procedures has resulted in the development of more and more personal relationships between subordinate and superior members of staff, causing the emergence of "ewuh pakewuh" culture. "Ewuh pakewuh" is a Javanese phrase, which means reluctance and failure among superiors to punish subordinates because of the development of familial relationships in the workplace. We explained in the case how superiors sometimes find it difficult to discipline subordinates because of the family relationship.Also, Javanese culture provides that conflicts are resolved through deliberation and negotiation, referred to as musyawarah. This concept, which is the indigenous way of decision-making, thus renders the roles of formal management controls less relevant. Ansari and Bell's (1991) work, based on Geertz (1983) , argued that a formal control system was only necessary to legitimize the organization with external parties. The formal rules and regulations only play the ceremonial role which is also reflected in trade union activities in our case study. The Indonesian labor laws fail to protect employees; hence the need to rely on social relations. In our case organization, a more powerful national labor union association was replaced by a less powerful internal labor union. The role of the labor union therefore changed from negotiating for the rights of employees to that of savings and loans, and coordinating lecturers' activities such as seminars. Dean (2001: 9) writes: "The Indonesian legal system by itself cannot be relied upon to secure contractual commitments or to secure property rights.
The law is but one instrument to secure rights, and in the Indonesian context, it should be considered secondary to other more important instruments". For example,
Indonesian labor law provides that technically, an employee can only be dismissed for misconduct, and the employee must first be given three separate warnings before any decision to dismiss him/her can be taken. However, management can avoid this process by handling the process through acceptable cultural principles such as negotiation, face-saving exit, or even money.
Our arguments certainly rely on one case study and we do not wish to generalize these views to all settings. However, this case has highlighted some of the crucial culture issues that may well explain some managerial practices in Indonesian organizations especially and less developed countries in general. Thus, we add to the small but growing body of empirical field research in this area. Tables   Table One: Relationship between Javanese cultural values and management controls Culture Definition Relevance to Management Controls Bapakism Javanese word which means paternalism and patronage. The father / elder demands respect, obedience and loyalty from subordinates
The CEO makes all important decision in the organization such as recruitment, budgeting and cost decisions, employee relations and salary. Employees rarely question the CEO's decisions. Rukun Javanese word which describes a state in which all parties at least overtly at social peace with one another. This is manifest through collective decision-making processes (musyawarah), unanimous decision (mufakat), co-operation (gotongroyong)
Centralized controls created some tensions among employees. However, the culture of rukun teaches them to maintain apparent peace with each other and try to conceal any conflicts and negative feelings.
Ewuh Pakewuh
Javanese Phrase, which means reluctance and failure among superiors to punish subordinates because of the development of familial relationships in the work place -Superiors failed to discipline their subordinates and let the CEO to solve all problems.
-The use of informal channel or "oral culture" is a powerful source of vertical information in the organisation. Shanker and Astrachan (1996) provided three different categorizations of FOBs. First, the broad definition recognized an FOB as a business that the effective control of strategic direction remains in the family though there is little direct family involvement in the running of the business. The middle definition recognized an FOB as where the founder/descendants have legal control of voting stocks, run the business and there is some family involvement in the running of the business. The narrow definition
